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Abstract
The U.S. administration, negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), is faced 
with a novel trade policy demand by U.S. industry: to include provisions against 
currency manipulation. This demand comes mainly from the U.S. car makers and 
targets Japanese exchange rate policies. The extraordinary focus of the U.S. 
automotive sector on currency disciplines in the TPP is puzzling. The puzzle 
cannot be sufficiently explained by Open Economy Politics (OEP), the main 
stream IPE approach which deducts domestic sectoral preferences from standard 
international trade theory. The car industry does not stand out from other U.S. 
manufacturing sectors which are export- and import competing with Japan. 
However, it stands out as a sector involved in a unique struggle with its Japanese 
counterpart for improving its global investment position. Japanese policies to 
weaken the yen have resulted in Japanese firms reaping massive windfall profits. 
This allows Japanese auto makers to challenge U.S. manufactures’ market share 
by expanding their global and regional production networks through boosting 
FDI. The profitability and investment dimension of exchange rate vulnerability is 
specific to the automotive sector’s organization of production in global value 
chains.  Profitability concerns explain why it is especially the U.S. auto makers 
which push for an inclusion of currency disciplines in the TPP.  OEP analysis 
proved insufficient to identify the importance of the global investment-trade link 
in this specific case because of its reductionist approach relying on conventional 
models of neo-classical trade theory. 
Key Words:  Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), currency manipulation, US trade 
policy, automotive sector, global value chains (GVCs), Open Economy 
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The U.S. administration, currently negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP),  regional trade agreement (RTA) with eleven Pacific Rim countries 
including Japan, is faced with a novel dimension of trade policy pressures by U.S. 
industry and their backers in the Congress: to include provisions against ‘currency 
manipulation’ or risk rejection of the final agreement in the U.S. legislature. The 
link between exchange rate policies and trade policy is nothing new. Major 
industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector have long pressed for the government 
to identify the exchange rate policies of major trading partners such as China or 
Japan as “currency manipulation” in order to justify countervailing protectionist 
measures. However, the TPP negations are the first instance that key industries 
oppose and U.S. Congress threaten to block a major international trade agreement 
if currency provisions are not included. Currency manipulation has entered the 
policy debate as a potential stumbling block for the TPP.1 
The two East Asian nations frequently accused of currency manipulation by 
U.S. policy makers are China and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Since TPP 
negotiations exclude China, but include Japan, it is Japan’s exchange rate policies 
what the currency manipulation issue within the TPP debate is really all about. 
Among U.S. manufacturing sectors competing with Japan it is the U.S. 
automakers which most forcefully demand those disciplines. Ford executive Joe 
Hinrichs, speaking at the 2014 Chicago Motor Show, demonstrates the concerns of 
the U.S. auto firms: 
“the real elephant in the room now is currency manipulation, and we need to 
make sure that it is not ignored. It represents the major trade barrier of the 21st 
century ̶ and it must be addressed in any future U.S. trade agreements.”2 
The extraordinary focus of the U.S. automotive sector on currency disciplines 
in their lobbying on the TPP is puzzling. Why is the automotive industry, in 
difference to other manufacturing industries exposed to trade with Japan, 
spearheading this policy demand? 
1. See The Washington Post, 13 November 2013, For controversial trade pact, fire from the left, 
the right and WikiLeaks. Available from < http://www.washingtonpost.com>.  Accessed 20 
October 2014. 
2. Quoted in MLive. 7 February 2014. Ford exec: Currency manipulation 'real elephant in the 
room. Available from http://www.mlive.com.
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“Currency manipulation” is a polemic rendering of “competitive devaluation”, 
a monetary strategy of mercantilist trade policy.3  Competitive devaluation, the 
deliberate intervention by a government to lower the value of its currency, 
supports the country’s traded goods sector by acting both as an import barrier and 
export subsidy. Such intervention by monetary authorities manipulates the 
foreign exchange market in pursuit of beggar-thy-neighbor policies towards a 
country ’s trading partners. It often triggers demands for countervailing 
protectionist measures in the domestic politics debate of these trading partners.4 
In International Political Economy (IPE) the Open Economy Politics (OEP) 
approach has systematically investigated the exchange rate preferences of 
domestic interest groups.5 Theoretical arguments on sectoral preferences, derived 
from international monetary and trade economics, are put to the test by rigorous 
empirical analysis.6 OEP analysis establishes that industry sectors exposed to 
exchange rate volatility will respond to the depreciation of competitor nation’s 
currencies with protectionist demands.  Starting from predictions deduced from 
international economics, Broz and Werfel, employing rigorous statistical analysis, 
confirm a causal link between of protectionist demands of U.S. industry sectors 
exposed to exchange rate volatility and U.S. dollar appreciation.7 In the first 
sections of this paper I apply the OEP approach to explain why it is the U.S. car 
industry, in contrast to other industries, which chose to home in on Japanese 
currency as a make-or-break issue of the TPP. Surprisingly, the OEP approach 
does not solve the puzzle. The unique policy concerns of the U.S. auto makers with 
the issue of Japanese competitive devaluations are insufficiently explained by 
deducting industry preferences from standard international trade theory.  To 
explain the unique lobbying profile of the U.S. auto makers they have to be 
understood as globally operating MNEs, as international investors focused on 
building global value chains (GVCs). I conclude that OEP, as it stands, is limited 
in its explanatory power by conceptualizing domestic interest group preferences to 
3. See Bergsten and Gagnon 2012.
4. The demands for countervailing duties by members of the U.S. Congress in response to 
Chinese interventionist management of the external value of the renminbi are the most obvious 
example. See Reuters, 5 June 2013, Senators renew push against China currency 'manipulation' 
despite yuan's rise.  <http://www.reuters.com>. Accesses 20 October 2014. 
5. The classic OEP-type study is Frieden 1991.
6. For an overview of OEP, see Lake 2006. 
7. Broz and Werfel 2014.
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narrowly in national lines. It misses out on the phenomenon of competition for 
global market share through global investment and production strategies. The 
domestic politics approach of OEP has to take “globalization” more seriously.
The study investigates the puzzle as follows: in the next section I will map 
out the political-economy rationale for addressing an international monetary 
issue, currency manipulation, within a trade agreement, the TPP. In section three 
I will establish the empirical puzzle: that it is specifically the U.S. automotive 
sector which lobbies for a currency clause in the TPP, in contrast to other U.S. 
industries competing with Japanese counterparts. Section four will apply the OEP 
approach to explain the car makers’ specific concern about currency manipulation. 
It will demonstrate that OEP analysis, deducing industry preferences on exchange 
rate policies from economic theory, cannot explain the preoccupation of the U.S. 
auto makers with Japanese currency manipulation. Section five will shift the 
focus of the investigation away from theoretical models to the actual concerns 
voiced by the car makers. It investigates the idiosyncratic policy demands of the 
“Detroit Three” (GM, Ford, Chrysler) by starting from their oligopolistic 
competition for global market share. In this process car firms, operating global 
value chains (GVCs) of production, compete through large scale international 
investment linked in with intra-industry trade, rather than simply through 
exports and import penetration. The section finds that Japanese yen depreciation, 
because it results in massive windfall profits for Japanese car makers, puts U.S. 
auto makers at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their Japanese counterparts in respect to 
their global investment position. The profit and FDI-boosting effect of Japanese 
exchange rate policies for Japanese car firms explains why America’s automotive 
MNEs are focusing on currency manipulation in their TPP lobbying effort. The 
conclusion comments on the limitations of the OEP approach. 
Demands for currency disciplines in the TPP trade agreement 
The link between exchange rate policies and trade policies is at the heart of 
the charges of currency manipulation brought against major U.S. trading partners 
by U.S. policy makers, legislators and domestic pressure groups. The U.S. Treasury 
Department describes currency manipulation as “countries manipulat[ing] the 
rate of exchange between their currency and the United States dollar for purposes 
of preventing effective balance of payments adjustment or gaining unfair 
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competitive advantage in international trade”. 8 Economically speaking, the trade 
effects of currency manipulation parallel those of a uniform import tariff and 
export subsidy (Staiger and Saykes, 2008). Academic research on the problem of 
currency manipulation focuses mainly on its contributing role to unsustainable 
global imbalances: the growing trade deficits of the U.S., and the growing build-up 
of U.S. dollar reserve holdings in the surplus countries.9 Especially international 
economists associated with the Washington Peterson Institute for International 
Economics argue that the massive interventions by mainly East Asian 
governments in the foreign exchange markets in recent years was undertaken to 
keep their currencies undervalued and thus boost their international 
competitiveness. Bergsten (2014a) maintains that without the currency 
manipulation of its trading partners “the United States could see its current 
account deficit cut by $200 billion to $500 billion per year and its unemployment 
rolls drop by 1 million to 5 million” (p. 28). 
The question of how the problem of currency manipulation can be addressed 
effectively has engendered strong demands for reforms to international economic 
governance, especially the governance of international trade. Narrowly defined, 
currency manipulation is a monetary issue, falling into the remit of the IMF. More 
broadly, as a substitute for import barriers and export subsidies, it is linked to 
international trade. The obvious forum to address the issue would be the IMF, in 
the context of its monitoring and reporting of currency misalignments, or the 
WTO, as a trade-related policy matter. IMF provisions on currency misalignments, 
however, are vague and weakly enforced. WTO agreements do not include 
currency provisions. However, if currency provisions were included in trade 
agreements, they would offer effective enforcement via their disputed settlement 
bodies and the threat of countervailing measures.10 Against the backdrop of the 
shift of the center of gravity of international trade negotiations from the 
deadlocked WTO to regional trade agreements, the current policy debate aims at 
the inclusion of a currency clause into the major regional trade agreement 
8. Office of International Affairs, U.S. Treasury, 2014, 2.
9. The currency manipulation explanation of global imbalances, defined as large current 
account imbalances, emphasises mercantilist behaviour by the East Asian trading partners of 
the United States (Bergsten and Gagnon 2012, Gagnon, 2012, 2013; Bergsten, 2014). Other 
explanations include trends in saving and investment balances, a U.S. productivity surge, the 
global saving glut, and distortions in financial markets (Chinn, 2011).   
10. For a review of possible solutions to how to address currency manipulation, see Bergsten, 
and Gagnon, 2012. 
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currently negotiated by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, the TPP. 
According to the Peterson Institute, currency provisions would fit well into a 
TPP agreement. Firstly, the TPP aims to be a “high-quality, 21st century” 
preferential trade agreement (PTA). It goes way beyond traditional PTAs by 
proposing a state-of-the-art trade liberalization agenda reflecting the growing 
linkages between trade, investment, global supply chains and behind-the-border 
regulatory issues. TPP would extend to trade-related issues such as the protection 
of intellectual property rights, incoming foreign direct investment, provisions 
against the preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises, and coherence of 
national regulatory regimes.11 In addition, modelled on KORUS, the Korea-U.S FTA 
effective since 2012, TPP promises to include trade-related labor and environmental 
standards. Given the wide ranging remit of the TPP on complex trade-related issues 
makes, why not incorporate a chapter on currency manipulation? As Bergsten 
(2014b) argues, “it would thus be anomalous if such agreements failed to include the 
currency topic, which is clearly more important quantitatively than any of the other 
issues being considered. Currency is politically sensitive in many countries but no 
more than other items being negotiated” (p. 9). 
A chapter on currency in the TPP would have to offer a clear definition of 
what constitutes currency manipulation and practical procedures of how it should 
be addressed. The Peterson Institute suggests that the definition of currency 
manipulation in trade agreements should meet a two-part test: “maintenance of 
significantly undervalued exchange rates inter alia through extensive intervention 
in the currency markets.”12 They propose identifying a case of currency 
manipulation by three key variables: “excessive” levels of foreign exchange market 
intervention, “excessive” current account deficits, and “excessive” accumulation of 
reserve.13 Interventions would have to be identified as serving the purpose of 
competitive devaluation. Other monetary (and fiscal) policies measures affecting 
the exchange rate, such as official interest rate policies and quantitative easing 
(QE), would be excluded. QE, even if it results in the depreciation of a country’s 
currency, is considered to be a legitimate macroeconomic policy tool, primarily 
serving domestic policy purposes such as stimulating growth, employment, or 
11. See Elms and Low, 2012.
12. Bergsten 2014a, 20.
13. See Bergsten, 2014a, for a detailed discussion of these variables and of what constitutes 
“excessive” in this context.
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raising levels of inflation. However, as Bergsten points out, currency manipulation 
has complex dimensions beyond the simple accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves. It can include “oral intervention”, attempting to influence market 
sentiment by talking the currency down, or monetary policy measures which 
outwardly target domestic variables, but implicitly aim at competitive 
depreciation. Obviously, such policies are hard to target with a currency chapter 
in the TPP which has to provide contractual clarity. However, they might be 
discouraged by the possibility that allegations of currency manipulation could 
result in a case being brought against the accused party in a future TPP dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
The Peterson institute accepts that, by its own definitions, Japan’s current 
monetary and exchange rate policies do not constitute a case of currency 
manipulation. This is in line with the latest report by the U.S. Treasury 
investigating major U.S. trading partners for currency manipulation, which 
explicitly exonerates Japan (Office of International Affairs, U.S. Treasury, 2014). 
Although Japan holds the world’s second largest foreign exchange reserves and 
has a history of competitive devaluations through currency intervention, it has 
abstained from foreign exchange intervention for three years. In recent G-7 and 
G-20 statements, Japanese officials have ruled out intervention as a monetary 
policy tool.14 The recent substantial depreciation of the yen on a trade weighted 
basis resulted not by intervention but from the massive increase in domestic 
money supply via the policy of QE as part of “Abenomics”, initiated by the Abe 
administration and the Japanese central bank since 2012. Officially Abenomics 
targets domestic inflation and not international competitiveness.  However, as 
David Pilling put it succinctly in the FT: “It is a truth universally acknowledged 
that a weak yen is good for Japan. It is a truth mostly unacknowledged – at least 
in Tokyo, where it is nonetheless secretly understood – that a weak currency is a 
vital plank of Shinzo Abe’s plans to reflate the economy.”15 Consequently the 
Peterson Institute maintains that Japan should be put on the “watch list” as a 
potential currency manipulator (Bergsten 2014b).
As to the question of how cases of currency manipulation could be addressed 
14. Office of International Affairs, U.S. Treasury, 2014. As of September 2014, the IMF valued 
Japan’s currency reserves at U.S. dollar 1.2 billion (IMF, 2014). 
15. David Pilling. A weak yen is no panacea but Shinzo Abe needs it all the same. Financial 
Times, 15 October 2014. Available from <http://www.ft.com>. Accessed 25 October 2014.
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and remedied, the Peterson Institute offers a range of steps in line with the usual 
provisions in RTAs and the WTO for the settlement of trade disputes. First an 
aggrieved country would bring a case of alleged currency manipulation by another 
member country to the TPP dispute settlement panel. If this country was found to 
be in violation of the currency chapter rules and failed to accept the 
recommendations by the dispute settlement panel, countervailing measures would 
be permitted. Such measures could be countervailing currency intervention or 
traditional trade policy measures such as countervailing duties on imports from the 
violating country to the aggrieved country (Bergsten and Gagnon, 2012). In short, a 
currency clause in the TPP promises not only to rule out clearly defined currency 
manipulation policies, but would to provide effective enforcement mechanisms. 
U.S. auto makers and their allies in congress have adopted the arguments put 
forward by the Peterson Institute and are pushing strongly for an inclusion of 
currency rules into the TPP.16 The mobilization of the congress by the auto makers 
has been impressive. Since mid-2013, the Obama administration faces increasing 
pressure from a bipartisan majority in both Houses, the House Ways and Means 
Committee and senior lawmakers in the U.S. Senate, demanding that currency 
manipulation is addressed in the TPP.17 In addition, 22 House Republicans and 
House Democrats threaten to oppose the renewal of Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA), preciously now as Fast Track Authority (FTA).18 Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA) restricts Congress to a simple up or down vote on a future TPP deal, 
increasing the chances for smooth ratification. If the policy demands on addressing 
currency manipulation in the TPP prevented a renewal of TPA, it could become a 
make-or-break issue for the ratification of the trade pact by the U.S. legislature. 
Although the U.S. car industry draws on academic arguments to lobby for a 
currency clause in the TPP, the academic debate about the causes of global 
16. The Wall Street Journal, 13 November 2013, U.S. Auto Makers Push for Currency 
Provisions in Asia-Pacific Trade Pact. Available from < http://online.wsj.com>.  Accessed 25 
October 2014.
17. See letter by 230 House lawmakers to President Obama of 6 June 2013. Available from 
<http://michaud.house.gov/press-release/majority-house-members-push-obama-address-
currency-manipulation-tpp>;  Letter by sixty U.S. Senators to Treasury Secretary Lew and U.S. 
Trade Representative Forman of 24 September 2013. Available at <http://www.stabenow.senate.
gov/?p=press_release&id=1171>;
18. Financial Times, 12 November 2013, House Republicans oppose fast-track authority on 
trade deals. Available from < http://www.ft.com>. Accessed 25 October 2014.
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imbalances the question whether Japan qualifies according to rigorous definitions 
of currency manipulation those definitions matters little. Their concerns are of a 
practical nature: the competitiveness gains of their Japanese counterparts due to 
the recent drastic depreciation of the yen against the dollar by about 40 percent. 
From an auto industry point-of view, Japanese monetary policy action resulting in 
a weakening yen constitutes a major threat as it manipulates key international 
prices, regardless of the wider domestic intentions of Abenomics. As the Financial 
Times put it, commenting on the letter on currency manipulation and the TPP 
sent by U.S. senators to President Obama: “Although the letter does not 
specifically mention Japan, it reflects growing anger on Capitol Hill and among 
American manufacturers, particularly US carmakers, at the devaluation of the 
yen under the new economic policies of prime minister Shinzo Abe.”19 
The industry stance on currency manipulation and Japan has evolved over 
time. Until 2013 their case was straightforward: The monetary component of 
Abenomics to weaken the yen in an attempt to revive the Japanese economy was 
considered to constitute unacceptable currency manipulation which should be met 
by reciprocal measures.20 When the Japanese currency broke through the 100 yen 
to the U.S. dollar level in May 2013, the U.S. car makers ’ main industry 
association, the American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC), did not mince words, 
stating that “the depth of Japanese currency manipulation has reached a new low. 
Japan’s monetary policies aimed at weakening the yen continue to boost Japan’s 
economy  ... at the expense of its trade partners. Japan should not be included in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership.”21    
However, over the last year the U.S. car industry, as a mater of political 
expediency, has adopted the narrow definition of what constitutes currency 
manipulation proposed by the Peterson Institute which avoids accusing Japan 
directly.  A key statement of late 2013 by the AAPC demands broadly that the 
19. Financial Times, 24 September 2013, Currency manipulation should be part of trade talks. 
Available from <http://www.ft.com>. Accessed 25 October 2014.
20. See interview of Matt Blunt, president of the American Automotive Policy Council, with 
Reuters. Reported in Reuters. 17 January 2013. Automakers urge U.S. fight Japan’s action to 
weaken yen. Available from <www.reuters.com>. Accessed 10 November 2014.
21. AAPC. May 2013. AAPC Statement on Japan’s Currency Hitting 100 Yen to the U.S. Dollar. 
Available from <http://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.clients/aapc/aapc/media/906/AAPC%20
Statement%20on%20Japan%E2%80%99s%20Currency%20Hitting%20100%20Yen%20to%20
the%20U.pdf?1368134524%20target=_blank>. Accessed 10 November 2014.
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manipulation of exchange rates by a TTP member should be prohibited in the TPP 
agreement and proposes the inclusion of a text which defines currency 
manipulation in terms of large-scale intervention, net accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves and prolonged current account surpluses.22 The new policy 
stance brings industry demands in line with the clearly defined proposals for a 
realistic currency clause in the TPP suggested by trade negotiation experts. 
However, the industries’ main concern remains Japanese exchange rate policies 
and yen depreciation. 
The puzzle: the U.S. car makers’ unique concern with currency 
manipulation 
Industry specific concerns about exchange rate policies vary. Exchange rate 
volatility matters more for the producers of tradable goods and services than 
those of non-tradable goods (Frieden 1991). Movement of the yen vis-à-vis the 
dollar affect mainly those sectors which compete strongly with Japan. However, 
their policy demands regarding the TPP and currency manipulation map out quite 
differently. As the following section will establish, only the automotive sector is 
seriously concerned about the issue.
U.S. trade with Japan is dominated by the manufacturing sector. In 2012 
manufactured goods accounted for 50 percent of total U.S. exports to Japan and 
for 82 percent of total Japanese imports to the United States.23 The principal U.S. 
manufacturing sectors exporting to Japan, were chemicals, aerospace, computers 
and electronics/electrical equipment, and machinery and equipment.24 The 
principal Japanese manufacturing sectors importing to the United Sates were 
cars and car parts, machinery and equipment, computers and electronics/electrical 
22. AAPC. To Ensure a Level Playing Field, US Automakers Support the Inclusion of Strong, 
Enforceable Currency Provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Available from <http://www.
americanautocouncil.org/tpp>.  Accessed 10 November 2014.
23. The trade and gross output data in this section (if not sourced otherwise) are from the 
following sources: Source of Trade Data: Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 'Global 
Patterns of U.S. Merchandise Trade'. Available from <http://tse.export.gov/TSE/TSEHome.aspx>; 
Office of the United States Trade Representative. Japan (29 April 2014). Available from < http://
www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/japan>;  Bureau of Economic Analysis, (BEA), 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP)-by-Industry Data, last updated 
July 25, 2014. Available from <http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm;> ; Own 
calculations. Sources accessed on 15 October 2014.
24. Sectors by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes.
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equipment, and chemicals (see Figure 1). The trade pattern represents a typical 
picture of intra-industry trade among industrial countries. Trade in the 
automotive sector is heavily asymmetrical in favor of Japan. 
I systemically screened statements by their main industry associations, listed 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce to measure to what degree the main U.S. 
manufacturing sectors competing with Japan are concerned about currency 
manipulation in their policy demands regarding TPP.25  The associations’ web 
pages were searched by the key word “TPP” for postings on the TPP. The postings 
were then analyzed for content and coded by nodes representing key policy 
demands regarding TPP. Nodes indicative of industry demands to address 
Japanese currency policies in the TPP are  “Currency Manipulation” , “Market 
Access” and “Focus on Japan”. 26 The coding results are presented in Table 1. They 
25. The web pages of the main U.S. Industry Associations listed by SelectUSA were accessed 
via the SelectUSA web page on 15 November 2014: U.S. Department of Commerce: SelectUSA: 
Industry Snapshots. Available from <http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots>.   Only 
industry associations which posted statements addressing the TPP on their web pages were 
included in the survey. Although the industry sectors covered by the Department of Commerce 
do not match the NAICS sectoral coding used in this paper, they are broadly in concordance. 
26. The nodes are: currency manipulation; market access: tariff and non-tariff trade barriers 
(NTBs); focus on Japan; opposition to the TPP without Japanese action on market access; high-
quality 21st century agenda; support for TPA.
Source: Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis, (BEA), U.S. 
Department of Commerce.
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Figure 1: Manufacturing Trade between the U.S. and Japan by Sector, 2012
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indicate a unique concern of the U.S. car industry with the participation of Japan 
in the TPP and the issue of currency manipulation. 
Table 1:  U.S. Manufacturing Industry Associations: Policy Statements on 
the TPP (as of November 2014)
Number of TPP Statements which…
U.S. Industry 
Associations
(Parentheses: No. of 
Statements 
addressing the TPP)
demand 
addressing 
Currency 
Manipulation
demand 
addressing 
Market Access 
(Tariffs, NTBs, 
Regulatory Issues
focus on 
Japan
demand Delay 
of the TPP 
until Japan 
concedes 
market access
demand full ‘21st 
Century 
Agenda’
(Regulatory 
coherence, IPR)
support 
Renewal 
of TPA
Automotive
American 
Automotive Policy 
Council (AAPC) (90)
66 43 45 40
Motor & Equipment 
Manufacturers 
Association 
(MEMA) (58)
7 19 16 6 2
Machinery & Equipment
Association of 
Equipment 
Manufacturers 
(AEM) (14)
2 1 2 8
Association for 
Manufacturing 
Technology (1)
1 1
National Electrical 
Manufacturers 
Association 
(NEMA) (12)
5 1 5 1
High Tec and Medical Technology
Advanced Medical 
Technology Association 
(AdvaMed) (4)
3 3
TechAmerica (4) 3 1 3 1
Chemicals 
American Chemistry 
Council (ACC)(6)
1 2 1 1
Society of Chemical 
Manufacturers and 
Affiliates(6)
1 1 4
Semiconductors No Statements on the TPP
Aerospace No Statements on the TPP
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The focus by the U.S. automotive sector on issues related to Japan when 
commenting on the TPP is extraordinary. Whereas other sectors, when mention 
Japan, do this mainly to point out that it is important to support the TPP as a 
major project of Asia-Pacific regional trade integration, the U.S. automakers 
emphasize that support for a TPP including Japan is conditional first of all on 
that Japanese currency manipulation and market access to Japan are sufficiently 
addressed. The AAPC, the main industry body of the U.S. car makers, posted 66 
statements demanding strong and enforceable disciplines on currency 
manipulation, referring either directly or indirectly to Japanese exchange rate 
policies. In addition, a substantial number of 43 statements demand that Japan 
opens up its domestic market to U.S. car imports by removing the fast range of 
hard to specify NTBs, such as regulatory, taxation and structural barriers which 
almost completely exclude U.S. cars. An equally significant number of 40 
statements oppose any TPP including Japan, insisting that only later, after it has 
built a multi-year track record of market opening, can Japan it be admitted to the 
agreement. A 2013 petition letter, still distributed by the Chrysler Group to its 
employees to be sent to Members of Congress, states the case of the Detroit Three 
against TPP concisely. It reads:
“Given Japan’s closed market and its unwillingness to reform, a trade 
agreement will only lock in one-way trade in Japan's favor.  ... We strongly oppose 
completing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Japan at this time because: 
– Japan has the most closed automotive market in the world; and 
– Japan continues to manipulate its currency to unfairly subsidize Japanese 
automakers.”27
The AAPC stance matches that of the other main industry association of the 
U.S. automotive sector, the car components makers association MEMA, although 
they put more emphasis on Japanese NTBs than on Japanese currency 
manipulation. Similar to the AAPC, MEMA makes support of the TPP conditional 
on the removal of these NTBs.28 
27. Chrysler Group, Petition Letter to Congress, November 2014. Available from < https://
casemgt-cg.extra.chrysler.com/ExternalAffairs/> . Accessed 10 November 2014.
28. MEMA mentions other broader, not directly Japan related TPP concerns, especially the 
protection if Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and shows stronger overall support for the TP, 
demanding a renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). 
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The strong emphasis on Japanese currency manipulation and market opening 
stands out compared to other manufacturing sectors. Other main U.S. 
manufacturing sectors competing with Japan (machinery and equipment, 
electrical equipment and high-tech industries, and chemicals) display a rather 
different profile of policy demands when it comes to TPP. Firstly none of those 
industries displays in their postings the singular focus on Japan typical for the 
auto makers. Rather than linking support for TPP to an exclusion of Japan, these 
sectors do not give the Japan issue much prominence, but instead show broad 
support of the TPP. This is indicated by the often fielded demand for a renewal of 
TPA by the Congress to assure a smooth legislative passage of a future agreement. 
Furthermore, these sectors are, except for one statement by the Association for 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT), not concerned about currency manipulation. 
Market access to Japan matters to some degree for the machinery sector which 
insists that TPP has to remove remaining tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. The 
electrical and high technologies industries display similar demands, but go beyond 
by strongly supporting the “high-quality, 21st century” liberalization agenda of the 
TPP. They demand behind-the-border liberalization through measures such as 
regulatory harmonization and coherence, transparency and strong protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). Their statements indicate that these industries 
are true stakeholders in the proposed trade agreement. They consequently voice 
support for a renewal of TPA. The chemical industry is even stronger in their 
support for the TPP and TPA renewal. However, their industry’s associations put 
more emphasis on traditional market opening targeting Japan and less on the 21st 
century agenda, except for IPR protection. Again, currency manipulation is not an 
issue. Finally, the semiconductor and aerospace industry associations do not list 
any statements concerning the TPP. It seems these industries do not consider the 
agreement a major policy challenge. The extraordinary preoccupation, in terms of 
quantity and content, of the U.S. auto industry with Japan, and especially 
Japanese currency manipulation, compared to the other manufacturing industries 
competing with Japan, is puzzling. What distinguishes the competitive struggle 
between the Japanese and U.S. automotive sector from other sectors to explain 
this unique profile of the car industry’s policy demands? Is the U.S. car industry 
specifically vulnerable to yen depreciation?
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The U.S. auto makers’ vulnerability to Japanese currency manipulation: 
The limits of the OEP explanation.
OEP predicts the foreign economic policy preferences of domestic interest 
groups by deducting those preferences from international economic theory. In this 
section I will apply the OEP approach to see whether it can explain why it is 
almost exclusively the U.S. car makers who insist on a currency clause in the TPP. 
Drawing on International economic models, I will establish the industry-specific 
vulnerability to yen depreciation against the U.S. dollar along the lines of OEP 
analysis. Differences in vulnerability should provide solid explanations for policy 
differences in industry lobbying regarding Japanese currency policies. Are the U.S. 
auto makers are specifically vulnerable to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-
vis the Japanese yen? 
The base line of OEP analysis of exchange rate preferences by sectoral 
interest groups draws on standard international trade economics: currency 
appreciation against the currency of a major trade partner will harm a country’s 
export-oriented and import competing manufacturers. Consequently, in the 
tradable-goods sector, industries can be expected to prefer government policies in 
international economic cooperation which result in a low and stable level of the 
exchange rate.29 This expectation is confirmed by the OEP finding that policies 
depreciating the real exchange rate of trade partners, perceived as competitive 
devaluations by export- and import-competing industries, have on aggregate 
resulted in increasing protectionist policies in the affected country (Oatley 2010; 
Broz and Frieden 2001). Broz and Werfel (2014) apply the general findings 
generated by OEP analysis on the exchange rate-trade protectionism link to the 
analysis of specific U.S. industries. They find that exchange rate vulnerability and 
subsequent protectionist pressure varies by industry.30  Investigating the response 
of U.S. industrial sectors to changes in the real effective exchange rate (REER) of 
the U.S. dollar, the authors establish that dollar appreciation resulted in an 
increased number of antidumping petitions by industries which are first of all 
characterized by high exchange rate pass-through. As they explain, the response 
of import competing industries to currency appreciation depends on their 
international position and market structure. The position and sensitivity to 
29. See Frieden1991, 1994; and Broz and Frieden 2006; Oatley, 2012, Chapter 12.
30. Broz and Werfel 2014, 394.
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exchange rate changes is moderated by three factors: exchange rate pass-through 
by foreign competitors to the price of manufacturing goods sold in the United 
States, import penetration of the American market relative to domestic 
consumption and the degree to which an industry depends on imported 
intermediate inputs.31 
Following Broz’ and Werfel’s framework, I will establish the vulnerability of 
the six major manufacturing sectors competing with Japan to yen depreciation. It 
can be assumed that industries with the highest vulnerability will most strongly 
respond to Japanese yen-policies which weaken the yen with demands for 
currency disciplines in the TPP. If these assumptions are correct, the U.S. car 
sector should be especially vulnerable to dollar appreciation against the yen. To 
rate the degree of vulnerability of the six industries to yen depreciation, I will 
assess the three key variables given by Broz and Werfel: the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through of a depreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the dollar to lower prices 
in the U.S. market by Japanese importers; the U.S. market share, i.e. import 
penetration, of Japanese industries import-competing with U.S. firms; and the 
degree to which the industrial sectors make use of intermediate inputs from 
Japan.  
Exchange rate pass-through of yen depreciation by Japanese importers to the 
U.S. can be incomplete. Depending on product type, corporate strategy, and market 
structure, firms may be more concerned about profits than market share and 
abstain from lowering prices in the United States in line with yen depreciation.32 
Low pass-through rates are also referred to as ‘pricing-to-market’ (PTM), a 
practice which has been found to be common for specialized manufacturing 
trade.33 From an U.S. import-competing industry point of view, sectors 
distinguished by high pass-through should be most concerned about possible 
currency manipulation by Japan, since depreciation of the yen would translate 
immediately into a threat to domestic market share by Japanese importers. 
Sectors with low pass-through rates should be less concerned, since yen 
depreciation without matching price reductions in the U.S. will not result in a 
direct threat to market share, although the Japanese competitors gain an indirect 
31. Broz and Werfel 2014, 397. The following is based on Broz’ and Werfel’s elaboration of these 
three factors.
32. See Krugman and Obstfeld 2009, 449.
33. See Ibid., 395.
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advantage in terms of increased revenues from exports to the United States. 
The import penetration rate is the percentage of domestic consumption 
covered by imports. A high import penetration rate indicates competitiveness 
problems of the import-competing domestic industry. U.S. industries which face 
high import penetration rates by their Japanese competitors can be expected to be 
more likely to ask for protection than more competitive export-oriented sectors 
(Rodrick 1995). When it comes to exchange rate policies, those industries should 
be highly alert about Japanese yen depreciation resulting in improved 
competitiveness of their Japanese counterparts.34 However, the exposure to 
import-competition is mitigated by the degree to which sector-specific imports 
from Japan constitute intermediate inputs for the industries operating in that 
sector.  For example, although the U.S. aerospace sector displays a high degree of 
Japanese import-penetration, most Japanese aerospace imports to the U.S. 
constitute intermediate inputs to the final product of companies such as Boeing. 
This implies that U.S. industries which rely strongly on imported intermediate 
imports from Japan will, in this aspect, profit from yen depreciation. These gains 
will partly offset the negative effects on U.S. competitiveness resulting from 
Japanese policies to weaken the yen.35 Consequently it can be expected that 
industries making use of large quantities of Japanese produced inputs, relative to 
output, will be less concerned about Japanese exchange rate policies lowering the 
value of the yen.  The key indicators which have to be taken into account to assess 
the degree of the vulnerability of U.S. manufacturing sectors to Japanese exchange 
rate policy are given in Table 2.
34. See Campa and Goldberg 1997.
35. See Ibid.
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Based on Table 2, I graded the six major U.S. manufacturing industries 
trading with Japan for their sensitivity to yen depreciation by allocating values 
for each of the moderating variables (pass-through, import penetration, 
intermediate inputs) on a scale of 1 to 3.36 The results of my assessment are 
presented in Table 3.
36. Vulnerability to exchange rate pass-through and import penetration is graded on the 
following scale: 1 = neutral; 2= vulnerable; and 3= very vulnerable. The scale is reversed for the 
offsetting use of intermediate imports, with 1 = low vulnerability because of high use of 
intermediate imports, 2= medium vulnerability; and 3 = high vulnerability because of low use of 
intermediate imports. 
Table 2:  U.S. Export-and Import Competing Industries with Japan: Key 
Indicators (2012)
(1)
X to Japan 
as % Gross 
Output
(2)
Country 
ranking of 
Japan as 
export 
destination
(3)
M from 
Japan as % of 
Domestic 
Consumption 
(Import 
Penetration)
(4)
Country 
ranking of 
Japan as 
country of  
origin of 
imports
(5)
Trade 
Balance with 
Japan as % of 
Gross Output
(6)
Intermediate 
Inputs as % 
of Gross 
Output
Machinery 1.0% 9 6.8% 1 -5.7% 63.0%
Computer, 
Electronics
2.4% 4 3.7% 3 -2.6% 33.7%
Electrical 
equipment
1.3% 5 3.7% 3 -3.5% 56.8%
Motor 
vehicles, 
Parts
0.3% 11 7.9% 2 -9.7% 77.0%
Aerospace 5.2% 3 4.8% 3 2.3% 59.2%*
Chemicals 1.4% 5 1.5% 5 -0.1% 53.4%
Sources:  Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis, (BEA), U.S. 
Department of Commerce; Bureau of Economic Analysis, (BEA), U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP)-by-Industry Data
*calculated for ‘other transportation equipment’ (other than motor vehicles and parts).
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Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Exchange rate pass-through is the most significant variable to predict 
whether U.S. industries will pressure the American administration to address 
Japanese currency policy in the TPP negotiations. As Broz and Werfel (2014) point 
out, “exchange rates appear to provoke protectionist lobbying only where high 
pass-through implies a strong negative impact on industry competitiveness” (p. 
414). In general, pass-through tends to be highest for competitive industries 
producing homogenous goods for sale to price-sensitive consumers, such as iron 
ore or petroleum products. It tends to be lowest in imperfect competitive 
industries where firms producing differentiated goods compete on quality or 
brand recognition, such as optical or medical equipment.37 In addition, industries 
37. See Goldberg and Knetter 1997.
Table 3: Vulnerability of U.S. Industries to Japanese Yen Depreciation 
Machinery Computer, 
Electronics
Electrical 
equipment
Motor 
vehicles, 
Parts
Aerospace Chemicals
(1) Sensitivity to 
exchange rate 
pass-through/
PTM 
1 1 1 1 1 2
(2) Levels of 
import 
penetration 
from Japan 
3 2 2 3 3 1
Intermediate Inputs*
(A) Intermediate 
inputs (total)*
1 3 2 1 1 2
(B) Import 
penetration
1 2 2 1 1 3
(C) Ranking of 
Japan as 
Importer*
1 2 2 1 2 3
(3) Intermediate 
inputs from 
Japan. Average 
of (A)(B)(C).*
1 2.3 2 1 1.3 2.7
* Low values indicate high use of imported intermediate inputs because it reduces exchange rate 
vulnerability!
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characterized by oligopolistic competition, such as the Japanese car industry, 
display low rates of exchange rate pass-through.38 To predict pass-through rates 
for specific industries, Rauch (1999) provided a classification of products by SITC 
code by three distinct categories: first, “homogenous products” (high pass-through); 
second, “reference-priced products” which are somehow unique but basically 
substitutable (medium pass-through); and third, “differentiated product”’ of great 
variety produced for specific consumer need, with producers competing on quality 
rather than price (low pass-through). Five of the six product groups investigated 
here (machinery and equipment, computer and electronics, electrical equipment, 
passenger cars and car parts, aircraft) were classified by Rauch predominantly as 
differentiated products (third group).39 Only the chemical sector offer a different 
picture: the majority of chemical products, such as acids and polyamides, are 
classified as reference-priced products (second group). A minority, mainly medical 
and pharmaceutical products, fall into the group of differentiated products. The 
U.S. auto industry, according to these classifications, does not stand out as 
specifically vulnerable to yen depreciation. On the contrary, similar to other 
engineering manufacturing industries competing with Japan, it competes on 
differentiated products. In addition, being distinguished by monopolistic 
competition, all indicators point at very low exchange rate pass-through in the car 
sector, which should alleviate concerns about Japanese currency manipulations. 
Instead industry pressure against Japanese monetary policies should originate 
from the chemical sector, the only key industry which produces to a significant 
extend standardized products. 
The picture is confirmed by the actual pricing behavior of key Japanese 
exporters to the United States since the rapid yen depreciation against the dollar 
associated with Abenomics.  Shimizu and Kiyotaka (2014), asking why the 
Japanese trade balance has not shown any improvement since the beginning of 
the recent yen depreciation, have investigated the pricing behavior of the three 
main Japanese manufacturing exporters,  general machinery, electric machinery 
and transport equipment, in terms of foreign invoice (contract) currency.40 About 
80 percent of Japanese exports are invoiced in foreign currency and almost 90 
38. See Krugman and Obstfeld 2009.
39. The United Nations Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) of goods used by 
Rauch differs from the United States NIACS classification code. However, the broad categories of 
SITC correspond to the NAICS groups used in this study.
40. The authors use the industry classifications of the Bank of Japan.
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percent of exports to the U.S. are invoiced in U.S. dollar. 41 Consequently their 
findings give a clear indication as to whether Japanese machinery, electrical 
machinery and auto makers passed through recent yen depreciation to lower U.S. 
dollar prices in the American market, or whether they went for pricing to market. 
The authors find that the export price indices in contract currency for general 
machinery and transportation equipment remained broadly stable despite the 
declining value of the yen vis-à-vis the dollar. Only the index for electrical 
machinery declined, but this was caused not be the pass-through of yen 
depreciation, but by the global decline in electronics prices.42 They conclude that, 
following the sharp depreciation of the yen, Japanese exporters, including the 
automotive sector, chose PTM behavior.43
Consequently, in Table 3, in the row indicating exchange rate vulnerability 
due to exchange rate pass-through, I give a value of 1 to the automotive industry, 
together with machinery, computers and electronics, electrical equipment, and 
aerospace (differentiated products – very low exchange rate pass-through, PTM 
likely), and 2 to chemicals (reference priced products – intermediate pass-
through). 
Import Penetration
Drawing on Broz and Werfel (2014), it can be expected that yen depreciation 
will induce more pressure from industries with high import penetration rates 
from Japan for action against Japanese monetary policies resulting in yen 
depreciation. High import penetration, if not associated with high rates of 
intermediate inputs from abroad, signal competitiveness problems of an industry 
in its home market, making that industry particularly vulnerable (Campa and 
Goldberg 1997). In Table 3 import penetration from Japan of the manufacturing 
industries competing with Japan is ranked in row 2 on a scale of 1 (low) to 3 
(high).44 The ranking indicates high vulnerability to yen depreciation for the car 
industry, together with machinery and the aerospace sector, as far as exposure to 
41. See Shimizu and Kiyotaka 2014, figure 17.
42. See Shimizu and Kiyotaka 2014, figure 11.
43. These findings are line with earlier studies. For example, Turkcan and Ates (2009) find a 
very low pass-through rate for Japanese auto imports to the U.S. market. However they 
investigate the period 1998 and 2006, broadly a period of yen appreciation vi-a-vis the dollar.  
44. The scale, based on the percentage values for import penetration from Japan given in Table 
2, Column 3, was defined as: 0% -1.5%: (1); 1.6%-4.7%:(2); 4.8%-7.9%: (3).
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import penetration from Japan is concerned. The electronics and the electrical 
equipment industries are less exposed, and the chemical sector seems least 
vulnerable. 
Intermediate Inputs
U.S.-Japan trade in manufacturing displays pattern of intra-industry trade 
typical for advanced economies (Schott 2014). Imports from Japan consist not just 
of final goods, but to a large extend of parts which enter as inputs into U.S. 
produced output. Following Broz and Werfel (2014), imports from Japan as result 
of outsourcing and the vertical organization of multinational production should 
mitigate concerns by U.S. industries about the effect of yen depreciation on their 
competitiveness.45 High rates of intermediate inputs from the depreciating country 
(Japan) will transfer the benefits of exchange rate pass-through from the 
importers of intermediate goods downstream to the producers of final goods. This 
will lower input costs and thus offset the vulnerability of final goods producers to 
high rates of import penetration.46 The industry-specific degree of use of 
intermediate inputs from Japan is determined by a subset of three variables: the 
percentage of intermediate inputs in final output, the degree to which 
intermediate inputs are filled by imports, and finally the degree to which these 
imports originate from Japan. I will assign a value on the scale of 1 to 3 to each of 
the three variables. In contrast to the scale for exchange rate pass-through and 
import penetration, value 1 will indicate high use of intermediate inputs because 
it reduces exchange rate vulnerability, 2 will indicate medium use of intermediate 
inputs and  3 low use, because it heightens the vulnerability to yen depreciation 
(see Table 3, Rows A, B, C).47 Finally I will take the average of the three values as 
an indicator of the extent to which U.S. industries are vulnerable to yen 
depreciation, because of a low use of intermediate inputs from Japan (Table 3, 
Row 3). 
Table 3, Row 3 indicates that of the key U.S. industries trading with Japan, 
machinery, the automotive industry and aerospace score low vulnerability values 
45. See also Milner 1988; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001.
46. See Koopman et al. 2013.
47. Row A is based on the indicators given in Table 2, Column 6. The scale is defined as: 0%-
34%: (3); 35%-57%: (2); 58%-80%: (1).  Row B inverses the scores of given in the same table for 
import penetration (Table 3, Row 2).  Row C is based on the rankings of Table 2, Column 4. The 
scale is defined as: Japan as importer ranking 5 or 6: (3); ranking 4 or 3: (2); ranking 2 or 1: (1). 
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because of their high degree of use of intermediate inputs from Japan, compared 
to computers and electronics, electrical equipment and chemicals. For the car 
sector disaggregate data confirm this that intermediate inputs are indeed filled to 
a large extent by imports from Japan. In 2012, Japan accounted for 22.9 percent 
of U.S. car imports, and for 15.6 percent of car part imports.48 After Mexico, Japan 
ranked second as country of origin for not only for automobile imports, but also for 
the import of car parts. This pattern justifies the low vulnerability score for the 
car industry given in Row 3.
Overall, the results of Table 3 are inconclusive. The car sector is not 
specifically vulnerable to high exchange rate pass-through. As in other industries, 
Japanese importers in this sector tend to price to market. It is the chemicals 
sector which is most exposed to pass-through. The U.S. auto industry is highly 
exposed to Japanese import penetration of its domestic market. But so are 
machinery and aerospace. In addition, the automotive industry makes high use of 
intermediate inputs originating from Japan, offsetting the detrimental effects of 
yen depreciation, which gives it a very low vulnerability score. Computers/
electronics and chemicals are much more exposed on this variable. The 
vulnerability indicators derived from economic variables based in international 
trade theory, identified by OEP analysis as relevant, cannot explain what caused 
the AAPC, and only the AAPC, to go all out in a unique lobbying campaign 
demanding the inclusion of currency disciplines in the TPP.  In the final 
assessment, the OEP analysis is insufficient to explain why it is particularly the 
U.S. auto makers which demand currency provisions in the TPP. Assuming that 
the international policy demands of U.S. industry are the expressions of rational 
utility maximizing economic actors, the basic approach of OEP is correct. What 
then explains its limitations when it comes to the specific case investigated in this 
paper? 
A special case of U.S.-Japanese competition: GVCs and Japanese 
FDI in the automotive sector
OEP analysis of industry responses to exchange rate volatility is rooted in 
neo-classical trade theory, looking at the trading sector in terms of export-oriented 
and import competing firms. To understand the importance of profitability for the 
48. Source: Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis, (BEA).
Bureau of Economic Analysis, (BEA), U.S. Dep
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competitive struggle of the Detroit Three with the big Japanese auto makers 
requires going beyond an international trade-focused to a global investment-
focused perspective. It requires looking at the car makers not primarily as 
domestic actors, as implied by the OEP approach, but as global MNEs, 
international investors operating vertically integrated global production networks, 
or global value chains (GVCs).49 From this perspective, competition for global 
market share through foreign direct investment (FDI) in the age of capital 
mobility is the determining corporate strategy, rather than competition for 
national market shares through exports and import penetration. The new 
competition is more about exploiting absolute location-specific advantages on a 
global scale by reinvesting profits in the construction of global production 
networks or Global Value Chains (GVCs) linked by intra-firm trade, rather than 
about exploiting efficiency gains from specialization on national comparative 
advantage through international trade.50  As OECD et al. (2014, 14) point out, the 
structural shift of technology and capital intensive MNEs to organize production 
globally in GVCs has created a new reality for trade. “The expansion of the 
operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as a business strategy (model) 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major driver of growth of 
GVCs .”51 A key feature of the fragmentation of production in GVCs is increasing 
intra-industry and intra-firm trade in intermediate goods. “The presence of 
foreign affiliates is clearly an important factor influencing both imported contents 
... and participation in international production networks.” Accordingly, over 70 
percent of global trade is now in intermediate goods and services and capital 
goods, reflecting the growing specialization in specific activities and stages in 
value chains.52  The structural shift in corporate strategy by MNEs to expanding 
their GVCs enhances the importance of high capital endowments relative to their 
competitors. As OECD et al. points out, FDI has been a major driver of the growth 
of GVCs, with a close correlation between rising FDI stocks and GVC 
49. The term refers to the increasing geographical fragmentation and organizational vertical 
and horizontal integration of production on a global scale through outward investment and 
intra-industry trade in intermediate goods (IDE-JETRO and WTO 2011).
50. Trade and investment flows as integral to GVCs pose a new challenge to the explanatory 
power of traditional neo-classical textbook economics. For a discussion of these limitations, see 
Winkler and Milberg, 2011. 
51. The OECD et al. establish a strong statistical correlation between FDI stock and 
participation in GVCs for developed countries (2014, Figure 3).
52. The interconnectedness between intra-firm and intra-industry trade and foreign 
investment has been explored in detail by Alfaro and Charlton (2009).
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participation.53 Penetrating foreign markets through growing GVCs requires that 
MNEs prioritize profitability in order to push outward investment to new levels. 
The challenges of posed by the new international oligopolistic competition via 
investing in GVCs are particular severe for the U.S. car makers. Over the last 
decades their Japanese counterparts have expanded their North-American market 
share by prioritizing FDI over exports from Japan, setting up overseas assembly 
plants integrated in their international supply chains. High profit margins are 
central to this strategy. By choosing to respond to yen depreciation with a PTM 
policy Japanese auto MNEs boosted profitability, advancing their competitive edge 
in the race of international investment vis-à-vis their U.S. competitors. 
Rather than the possibility of exchange rate pass-through, that is lower sale 
prices of Japanese cars in the U.S. market, it is PTM, the Japanese deciding not to 
undercut the prices of their U.S. counterparts, which concerns U.S. car makers. 
The comment by Ford’s executive Joe Hinrichs reveals that it is not lower 
Japanese pricing in the U.S., but rising Japanese profit margins which is at the 
heart of the concerns of U.S. car firms: After stating that weakening of the yen 
puts roughly $2,000 per export vehicle in the pockets of Japan’s three largest 
automakers – Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, he continues:  "When Toyota came out 
and said half their profits are due to currency change of the yen, that's a big 
deal.” 54 Matt Blunt, president of the AAPC, in an interview on the TPP, makes the 
same arguments on the detrimental effects of currency manipulation: “That gives 
foreign automakers like Japan a real competitive advantage and it affects U.S. 
sales. Japan is generating a windfall profit of billions of dollars on an annual basis 
that they can reinvest into their industry.”55 The rising profits from yen 
depreciation by Japanese car makers are impressive indeed: Toyota, for example, 
reported 2013 annual earnings of about as much as the combined profits at the 
next two biggest automakers, Volkswagen and General Motors.56  
53. OECD et al. 2014, 7.
54. Quoted in MLive, 7 February 2014, Ford exec: Currency manipulation 'real elephant in the 
room. Available from <http://www.mlive.com>. Accessed 5 November 2014.
55. Quotes in The Vindicator: Vindy.com, the valleys homepage, 7 September 2013, Auto 
industry gets tough on Japan in trade agreement talks. Available from <http://www.vindy.com>. 
Accessed  19 November 2014.
56. Bloomberg Businessweek, 5 February 2014, Toyota Jumps Most Since June on Forecast for 
Record Profit. Available from < http://www.businessweek.com/news>.  Accessed 25 October 2014.
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The challenge posed to U.S. auto makers by Japanese FDI is uniquely severe, 
compared to other sectors. Whereas the other industries competing with Japan 
are leading their Japanese competitors when it comes to their global investment 
position, the U.S. car makers lag behind (see Figure 2).  Windfall profits from 
Japanese exchange rate policies add to the Japanese capacity to expand 
investment globally, posing the risk that the Detroit Three will fall further behind 
in the investment race. Identifying this challenge goes a long way to explain the 
preoccupation of the AAPC with Japan’s monetary policy of Abenomics.
The link between yen depreciation and windfall profits of Japanese auto 
makers has a specifically troubling regional dimension for their U.S. counterparts. 
The competitive challenge the U.S. automotive industry faces from Japanese FDI 
in North America is substantial and unique to this industry. For 2012, a 
breakdown of unit sales for the main Japanese car firms shows that 70 percent of 
cars sold by Toyota, 94 percent of Honda cars, and 73 percent of Nissan cars were 
Source:  ITC, FDI Statistics. Available from <http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-
outward-country-industry>. Accessed 12 November 2014.
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made within the U.S (Figure 3).57 Furthermore, these Japanese plants are the 
destination of most of the car parts imported to the United States from Japan. 
Japanese owned U.S. assembly plants, which are integral part of Japanese car 
production organized in GVCs, rely heavily on imported components, mainly 
supplied by Japanese car part makers closely integrated with the big Japanese 
automotive firms (Turkcan and Ates, 2009). Studies of the structure of the U.S. 
automotive sector by Klier and Rubenstein (2006, 2007) find that the domestic 
content of Asian assembly plants in the United States and Canada is only between 
60 to 70 percent.
Boosted by windfall profits, Japanese car firms are pushing FDI within the 
North American region to a new level. The scale of the challenge is illustrated by 
a recent analysis in the Wall Street Journal. It reports that Japanese auto makers, 
enjoying a tailwind from the yen’s recent decline against the dollar, are launching 
57. Source: The Wall Street Journal, Market Data Center, Auto Sales. Available from  <http://
online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html#autosalesE>. Accessed 7 November 2014. 
In contrast, the U.S. automakers do not sell any locally assembled cars in Japan. For 
transportation equipment, in 2012 the FDI stock of U.S. firms in Japan was just 5% of Japanese 
stock in the U.S. (Schott 2014, Table 4).
Figure 3: US Sales of Japanese Auto Makers by Origin of Production (2012)*
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a major assembly plant expansion in North America, primarily targeting the U.S. 
market. Honda, which now exports more cars from the U.S. to Japan than vice 
versa, is going to open a new factory in Mexico. Toyota is spending 2 billion U.S. 
dollar to add about 145,000 vehicles a year to its assembly capacity and is 
expanding its North American engine- and transmission-making capability.58 
The Japanese investment drive is fuelled not just by rising profits reaped 
from PTM of Japanese vehicles imported from Japan, but also by rising profit 
margins from the sale of cars assembled within the U.S.. Whereas Japanese car 
makers have opted to keep sale prices in the U.S. stable, both for imports and U.S. 
assembled cars, Japanese makers of car parts producing in Japan and supplying 
Japanese assembly plants in the U.S., chose the opposite pricing policy: they tend 
to pass through depreciation to lower U.S. dollar prices. This passes profit 
windfalls from yen depreciation downstream, via lower input costs for Japanese 
cars assembled in North America. As Turkcan and Ates (2009) suggest, “the 
increase in foreign transplant company shares in the US and their preference to 
obtain intermediate goods from their source country may explain relatively higher 
pass-through rates into auto-part import prices” (p. 9). 59  The close relationship 
between Japanese car firms operating assembly plants in the U.S. and Japanese 
importer of car parts makes the OEP argument that high shares of intermediate 
inputs from a competing trading partner will offset exchange rate movements 
obsolete for the case of the Detroit Three. It is Japanese firms, and not their U.S. 
competitors, which gain from the lower input costs resulting from yen depreciation 
because Japanese intermediate inputs enter predominantly into the supply chains 
of Japanese assembly plants. This situation is unique for the U.S. car sector; no 
other key manufacturing sector exposed to trade with Japan displays such high 
rates of Japanese FDI and the associated pattern of Japanese intermediate inputs 
destined for Japanese output within the United States (see Figure 4).
58. The Wall Street Journal, 28 January 2014, Honda's U.S. Factories Hit Export Milestone. 
Available at < http://online.wsj.com>.  Accessed 5 November 2014.
59. Calculating the U.S. domestic content of all Japanese cars sold in the U.S. in 2006, that is 
imports plus U.S. assembly, Klier and Rubenstein (2007) give a ratio of only 40 percent domestic 
content, which explains the massive increase in profit margins reaped by the Japanese firms in 
phases of yen depreciation.
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To sum up, the demands by the Detroit Three for currency disciplines in the 
TPP have to be interpreted in the light of the detrimental consequences Japanese 
PTM has for U.S. automakers in their struggle to keep up with Japanese 
investment, globally and in the North American region. The fact that, contrary to 
assumptions informing the OPP approach, PTM by Japanese competitors is not a 
blessing for U.S. car makers, but a curse, explains why the Detroit Three put 
Japanese currency policies which weaken the yen at the top of their TPP lobbying 
agenda. This link is only revealed by looking at the Japanese competitive 
challenge not as originating from cross-border trade, but from Japanese FDI to 
expand the production networks unique for Japanese auto makers.  
The link between yen depreciation, PTM, Japanese profitability and increased 
FDI in GVCs resolves the puzzle of why it is predominantly the auto makers who 
table demands for a currency clause in their lobbying on the TPP. None of the 
other main industries is faced with global competition from FDI by their Japanese 
rivals to the extent of the auto makers. Nor do the other industries display a 
Figure 4:  Total Assets of Major Japanese Industries in the U.S. 
(2011, in U.S. dollar bn)*
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penetration of their home base by Japanese FDI on the scale of the U.S. auto 
industry. Finally, the close relationship between Japanese car part importers and 
Japanese assembly plants invalidates the mitigating argument that U.S. car 
producers should gain from high levels of imports of intermediate inputs from 
Japan, further adding to the exposure of the Detroit Three to yen depreciation. 
Again, this is a situation unique to the automotive sector. Because international 
trade and investment are increasingly interconnected in GVCs, Japanese policies 
aiming at depreciating the yen are now perceived by U.S. auto makers primarily 
as a threat to their global and regional investment position relative to their 
Japanese counterparts. 
As OECD et al. (2014) suggest, the emergence of complex goods and production 
processes in the form of GVCs have affected how firms make strategic policy 
decisions, requiring politicians to take a more holistic approach to trade and 
investment policies. As the TPP’s high-quality, 21st century liberalization agenda 
demonstrates, distortions to international trade has now to be addressed in 
conjunction with distortions to international investment. This inevitably brings in 
the problem of the windfall profits for MNEs resulting from competitive 
devaluation policies by their home country. Although its seems unlikely that the 
Detroit Three will succeed with bringing in currency disciplines to the TPP, trade 
policy makers will likely face growing pressures for an inclusion of currency 
disciplines into state-of-the-art trade agreements. 
Conclusion
The OEP analysis suffered from taking insufficient account of the links 
between trade and FDI in the age of globalization. As a result it overlooked that 
the unique policy preferences of U.S. based automotive MNEs are primarily rooted 
in concerns about their relative investment position vis-à-vis their Japanese 
competitors. As the case of Japanese exchange rate policies and the U.S. car 
industry demonstrates, the dividing line in terms of who wins and who loses from 
these policies is not between export-oriented Japanese firms as winners and 
import-competing U.S firms as losers, but between Japanese MNEs as winners 
over U.S. firms in the race for expanding global investment. The FDI factor 
explains why it is high rates of Japanese PTM, the flip-side of low exchange rate 
pass-through, which makes the U.S. industry vulnerable to yen depreciation. In a 
world in which not just goods, but capital is mobile across borders, manufacturing 
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MNEs compete for global market share by expanding vertically integrated 
production networks through a strategic focus on raising FDI. Currency policies 
which weaken the yen allow Japanese automotive MNEs to reap massive profit 
windfalls which are reinvested globally. This gives them an edge as global 
investors over their U.S. competitors.  An OEP analysis which relies excessively on 
standard trade theory and defines vulnerability to currency manipulation mainly 
in terms of high exchange rate pass-through and see high rates of intermediate 
imports from the depreciating country as a mitigating factor, fails to take account 
of the complexity of GVCs.  
Why does OEP analysis draw on conventional neo-classical economic theories 
which themselves struggle to incorporate the new quality of international 
economics in the age of global production?  Oatley (2011), in his critique of the 
OEP approach in IPE, points out that, in its pursuit of scientific rigor, OEP takes 
the risk of “methodological reductionism”. Firstly, the approach tends to neglect 
causally significant complex global processes which cannot be analyzed clearly 
along domestic-international lines.  In Oatley’s words, “as national economies 
have grown evermore deeply enmeshed in cross-border networks of investment, 
production, and trade, American international political economy (IPE) scholars 
have focused evermore heavily on domestic politics” (p. 311). Secondly, OEP tends 
to omit global complexity which does not fit into neat models of causal 
relationships deduced from clear-cut international trade and exchange rate 
economics. Its positivist approach, which starts from law-like generalizations 
drawn from textbook economics amenable to empirical testing, fails to engage in 
problem-driven research (p.335). The failure to infer the causes of the U.S. car 
industry’s’ pressure for currency disciplines in the TPP from an OEP framework 
of analysis demonstrates the two risks of the “reductionist gamble”. The seemingly 
paradoxical alarm of the Detroit Three about Japanese profitability as result of 
Japanese PTM is only explained by taking account of the global complexities of 
automotive trade interlinked with FDI in GVCs, complexities which distinguish 
the car sector from other U.S. industries. Taking less rigorous, but more problem-
driven and inductive approach than suggested by OEP helped to reveal these 
complexities. Starting from the specific concerns of the U.S. auto makers helped to 
overcome the limitations of OEP’s reductionist gamble. 
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